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INTRODUCTION
The team’s objective was to explore how an Operational 
Synthesis approach, i.e. making use of a variety of models 
and tools to investigate different aspects of the same 
problem, could improve the overall  quality of the analysis. 
The scenario on crowd control in a stabilization operation 
used by Team 03 at IDFW 15 was the test case for this 
exploration. MANA and Automated Red Teaming (ART) 
were applied to identify the scenario with the most 
challenging demonstrator behavior.  This "worst case" 
scenario was then represented in PAX1  to investigate 
questions related to the effect of military Rules of 
Engagement (RoEs) on civilians and effects of escalation 
caused by civilians through the use of the PAX Analysis 
Toolbox.
OPERATIONAL SYNTHESIS
Operational Synthesis (see Figure 1) is a process which 
focuses on looking at the whole rather than reducing 
systems into parts. The goal of Operational Synthesis can be 
expressed as utilizing each individual tool for what it is good 
at, and combining the result in a manner that synthesizes the 
resultant wealth of information.
Figure 1: Diagrammatic Representation of Operational Synthesis
Scenario
The scenario examined during the workshop was based on a 
crowd control "Demonstration" situation in a stabilization 
operation, similar to the scenario examined by Team 3 
during IDFW 15. The team’s intention was to use this 
scenario as a test-case for exploring the process of 
conducting Operational Synthesis. (See Figure 2 for the 
geographical disposition of the various constituents of the 
scenario)
Figure 2: 3D view of the scenario layout
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1 Note that a 1:1 representation of one and the same scenario in two different simulation models is hardly ever possible. Instead, 
the team captured the main features of the scenario, especially with regard to the aspects relevant and under observation with 
PAX.
In the scenario, an event organized by political-religious 
Party A was taking place in a town hall  in a part of a town 
predominantly inhabited and controlled by Party B.  When 
the event ended, Party A members had the intention to leave 
the town hall as soon as possible and return home via a road 
heading south.  The Peacekeeping force PAXFOR received 
intelligence reports that a group of Party B members, known 
for their political disagreement with Party A and aggressive in 
behavior, had announced that a demonstration march would 
be carried out towards the location where Party A members 
were meeting.  In addition, a small group of young Party B 
members, known for possible violent actions and persistent 
intent to cause harm to Party A members, were expected to 
join in this counter-demonstration.  Party B members had the 
intent to hold the demonstration outside the town hall and 
confront Party A members when they were leaving the town 
hall.  The PAXFOR identified the possibility that Party A and 
Party B members would be injured due to the confrontation 
and intended to separate the two groups by forming a 
separation line in front of the town hall.  
Questions
"What would be particularly challenging situations that may 
arise, and the  RoEs that would be helpful to the peacekeepers  in 
these situations?"
The Process
Based on the questions and the scenario, and taking into 
consideration the strengths and limitations of MANA, PAX 
and ART, the team developed the proposed iterative process 
for an Operational Synthesis (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Iterative process for Operational Synthesis
Step 1: Identifying questions and defining an 
appropriate MOE to address the real world problem.
The team discussed the need to focus on a single common 
MOE that would be relevant to the question and ideally 
could be obtained from both the MANA and PAX models. 
However, as MANA and PAX are designed to study different 
aspects of operational problems, they naturally have 
different sets of MOEs.  After some deliberation, "Wounded 
Party A members" was chosen as the "common" MOE.
Step 2: Developing and implementing the scenario 
in MANA; performing single runs and identifying 
parameters that are relevant to the study.
After the scenario was developed in MANA (see Figure 4), it 
was decided that a second line of Peacekeepers be included 
in the demonstration area to make the "blue" plan more 
robust and more effective in separating the Party A and 
Party B members.  The intention of adding the second line of 
Peacekeepers would be to help deter and repel any Party B 
demonstrators who managed to penetrate through the first 
separation line. It was also decided that the scenario would 
be more challenging if the Party B  violent youths were to 
mix within Party B demonstrators and approach directly 
from the front of the separation lines.
Figure 4: Geographical representation of MANA scenario
Step 3: Applying ART to the MANA scenario and 
evaluating the performance of the MOE based on 
generated changes to the parameters. Interpreting 
the parameter improvement with perspective of the 
real world problem.
The scenario developed in MANA was submitted for ART 
runs. The objective was to identify challenging movement 
and behavior emerged from Party B parameters that would 
maximize the number of wounded Party A members.
The following set of parameters was included to be 
varied within the specified range of values in the ART 
submission (Table 1):
Parameters submitted to ART Parameter Values in MANA
Baseline Min Max
Party B Demonstrators
















Duration of Interaction with 
Peacekeepers (time steps), i.e. 
when will they back off.
100 10 200
Duration of Backing off (time 
steps), i.e. when will they come 
back to confront the PAXFOR 
again.
100 10 200
Party B Violent Youths
















Duration of Interaction with 
Peacekeepers (time steps)
100 10 200
Table 1: Submitted parameters and range of values
The ART submission was sent to the cluster in Singapore 
and the results presented in Table 2 were obtained:
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Parameters submitted to ART Parameter Values in MANA
Baseline Best Results from 
ART
Party B Demonstrators
Starting Location (along horizontal 
axis)
450 471
Cohesiveness during Movement -30 33
Duration of Interaction with 
Peacekeepers (time steps)
100 64
Duration of Backing off (time steps) 100 35
Party B Violent Youths
Starting Location (along horizontal 
axis)
450 445
Cohesiveness during Movement -30 4
Duration of Interaction with 
Peacekeepers (timesteps)
50 194






Table 2: Comparing parameter values and MOE values of the best 
case with regard to Party B from ART run
It was evident that ART was able to increase the number 
of wounded Party A members from the original 25 out of 60 
(42%) in the baseline to 60 (100%) in the ART scenario.  
Figure 5: Emergent movement of the 
Party B members based on ART output
Figure 6: Emergent interaction behavior of the 
Party B members based on ART output
Two key points optimizing Party B's tactics were 
observed in the "ART-ed" scenario:
1. Concentrate demonstration on one section of the 
line to overwhelm the peacekeepers. (Figure 5)
2. Optimal interaction and back-off times that will 
keep large numbers of the Party B members 
between the lines. (Figure 6)
Step 4: Based on the interpretations of the ART 
results, deducing adaptations for the PAX and 
integrating them in the PAX scenario.
The resulting movement and behavior of Party B 
members identified from the MANA-ART effort were 
transferred to the PAX scenario, as applicable. Due to 
difference of the grid size in the PAX scenario only the group 
ratios were kept consistent across the MANA and PAX 
scenarios (Figure 7)
Figure 7: Geographical disposition of agents within PAX model
Step 5: Performing design of experiment and 
running data farming on PAX.  Performing analysis 
on the PAX output.
With the challenging Party B behavior modeled in the 
PAX scenario, the team proceeded to address another aspect 
of the questions, which was on the possible RoEs that the 
peacekeepers could adopt to reduce the number of wounded 
Party A members. For this purpose, the team developed a new 
rule set, shown in Figure 8, which was based on the IDFW15 
rule set but did not include any arrests, to compare this new 
rule set to the IDFW15 one as well as the "default" rule sets 
"PSO Manual" and "Gandhi."
Figure 8: PAX rule set developed at IDFW16
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In addition to examining the rule set, the team also 
decided to investigate two other factors that could not be 
represented in MANA, but were of interest with regard to the 
PSO aspects that can be modeled in PAX. Namely, the initial 
readiness for aggression of the Party B members and the 
deterrence effect by the presence of the peacekeepers (the so-
called "dog factor") were selected as additional factors for the 
upcoming Data Farming experiment.
Finally a full factorial design of experiment as shown in 
Table 3, consisting of a total of 4480 runs (224 variations x 20 
replicates), was submitted to the 128 node cluster of the 
Simulation and Test Environment of the German Bundeswehr.
Full Factorial Farming Parameters Min Max Step Size
Party B counter-demonstrators readiness for 
aggression 30 90 10
Party B counter-demonstrators dog factor 0.1 1.5 0.2
Soldiers' rule set 1 4 1
Table 3: Parameters varied in full factorial design study
When analyzing this study, one of the immediate findings 
was that in the PAX scenario hardly any Party A member was 
actually ever injured (see Figure 9) as opposed to almost every 
one being injured in the respective MANA scenario. This 
confirmed the group's expectation that the "same" scenario, 
modeled in different simulation models, will almost certainly 
take a different course of events and hence the results will be 
different, even if the names of the MOEs under consideration 
may be the same. In this particular case, the reasons for this 
include, but are not limited to, the following:
• The criteria of when to consider a civilian "wounded" 
are different in PAX and MANA.
• The RoEs of the soldiers modeled in PAX were quite 
different from and comprised more detail than their 
reactions in MANA.
• The civilians' complex behavior model in PAX, 
especially with regard to emotional factors, was very 
different from the rather simplistic behavior of the 
civilians scripted in MANA.
Figure 9: Number of wounded Party A members 
with IDFW16 rule set
One of the "lessons learned" the team drew from this was 
that, instead of comparing the two models and the course of 
events of the scenario in each, we should concentrate on the 
parameters and aspects the team had not even been able to 
model in MANA in the first place. This, in fact, complies with 
one of the team's key objectives: the ability to observe a 
problem from different perspectives using various tools and 
thus gain insights into various aspects of the problem at hand 
that could not have been obtained by using just one of the 
tools or models.
To point out one example, we will  explain one of the 
team's findings with regard to the aggregated level of 
escalation caused by the civilians (i.e. aggressive actions 
performed by the respective civilians).
The group noticed that with the second line of soldiers 
the overall escalation shows a roughly polynomial decrease 
with respect to Party B's military dog factor as opposed to a 
roughly linear decrease observed with the original IDFW15 
scenario (see Figure 10).
Figure 10: Comparison of the PAX scenarios with regard to the 
MOE "Aggregated Escalation by Civilians"
First of all, this confirms the rather obvious expectation 
that escalation can be kept low by either  having more soldiers 
in the area or increasing the soldiers' deterrence effect by any 
means. In addition to this, however, the results of the PAX 
study suggest that with an increasing number of soldiers their 
individual deterrence effect, at least above a certain threshold, 
becomes even more efficient.
In other words, the analysis shows that with the second 
line of peacekeepers the PSO force is able to keep the 
escalation level very low even with a rather  reasonable  ability to 
deter the demonstrators. As a side-effect, this deployment is 
more robust with regard to the counter-demonstrators' 
readiness for aggression.
Further analyses, such as comparison of the different rule 
sets, were performed by the team but will not be described 
here for the sake of brevity.
Step 6: Applying the analysis result to gain insights 
to the questions identified for the real world 
problem.
This is essentially the final step.  However, as the scenario 
was used as a test-case only rather than to examine a real 
operational problem, this step was not executed methodically. 
Although some very basic tendencies could be derived by 
using the respective strengths of both MANA and PAX, such 
as the introduction of a second line of soldiers and some 
possible conclusions as to the soldiers' RoEs, further actions 
would have to be taken to be able to perform this step.
To mention just a few, a much more detailed preparation 
of the scenarios, a more thorough analysis as well as further 
interpretation of the findings by military experts would 
certainly be necessary to draw conclusions with the 
confidence required for applying the results to a real-world 
problem.
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CONCLUSION
Challenges of Operational Synthesis
Throughout the week, the team also discussed and noted the 
experiences with and the challenges of Operational 
Synthesis:
3. Identifying questions and common MOE. 
Identifying a common MOE that allows analysis to 
be conducted to address these questions was a 
challenge.  Models like MANA and PAX would 
represent and measure effects of actions differently 
and hence certain MOEs, although named similarly, 
may not be measuring the same effects within the 
models.  Hence if a common MOE is desired it 
would be important to establish what would be the 
relevant and common MOE(s) when dealing with 
different models to avoid confusion during the 
analysis stage.
4. Representing common aspects of a scenario in 
different models.  Although it was possible to 
achieve cosmetic and physical similarity between 
different models like MANA and PAX, it is difficult 
to make different agent-based models function and 
emerge in a similar  way to generate comparable 
results. One possible conclusion could be to put 
more effort on functional instead of parametric 
similarity so that similar effects would be 
represented in the two models. On the other hand, 
the team's experience has rather indicated that it is 
generally not even desirable to make two models 
behave exactly the same way since that eventually 
breaks down to having just one ("synchronized") 
model instead of making full use of the benefits of 
having different models to study different aspects 
and probably even different vignettes of a question.
5. Transferring analysis findings between models. 
Since MANA and PAX are different models, the 
results obtained from the ART runs on MANA 
would not be directly transferable to the PAX 
model, at least in the parametric sense.  The main 
challenge would be to decide how best to represent 
these MANA findings in the PAX model.  
Benefits of Operational Synthesis
6. Better understanding of  the models. First of all, the 
use of different tools and models broadens the 
analysts' horizon and gives them insight into the 
models that goes far beyond simply using one and 
the other. Due to the necessity to carefully set up 
analyses and experiments with more than one 
model and then comparing their results a deeper 
understanding of the internal operation of each of 
them is required and obtained.
7. More comprehensive analysis capabilities.  The 
Operational Synthesis approach enabled the team 
to look at the question set from different angles and 
on different operational levels. Thus the whole 
process and the combination of tools, models and 
methods thoroughly enhances the ability to 
develop, test and elaborate RoEs as well as Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs).
8. Further applications. Beside the advantages afore-
mentioned, the methodology seems to be very well 
applicable to the calibration and validation of 
simulation models, for example. Using ART to 
"optimize" a scenario towards a result observed in 
the real world as well  as the deep understanding of 
the model gained during the whole process of 
Operational Synthesis promise to be tremendously 
helpful during model calibration and validation.
Summary
As mentioned earlier, the team objective in this workshop 
was to focus on exercising and gaining insights on the 
process of Operational Synthesis, rather than examining a 
real operational problem.  Through this exploration, the 
team discovered the key benefits of the Operational 
Synthesis approach.  In particular, the approach allowed 
high-level as well as low-level resolution analyses.  Deeper 
insights on the dynamics of the scenario and models could 
be gained.  The team had also gathered many useful insights 
on the challenges of executing the Operational Synthesis 
process.  Last but not least, the team had benefited greatly 
from a truly international collaborative effort as many useful 
ideas and insights were contributed by participants from 
Singapore, Germany, New Zealand and the United States.
In summary, the Operational Synthesis approach as 
performed by Team 3 promises to provide a new quality to the 
analysis of (Peace Support) Operations by enabling the 
analyst to take into consideration a variety of aspects and 
questions otherwise unaccounted for. Nevertheless, further 
work and research has to be done to improve the tool support 
and integration (e.g. providing Automated Red Teaming 
support for PAX) on the one hand but also formalizing the 
possibilities and limitations of the approach to make the best 
and most efficient use of it.
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